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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
menced by filing a complaint with the court,"' 8 and "upon the filing of
the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver it
for service to the marshal. . ". ."" Although there has been a question of
interpretation,20 the prevailing view is that filing the complaint con-
ditionally suspends the statute of limitations, provided that the summons
is issued "forthwith" and served within a reasonable time thereafter.2'
The rule announced in the Robinson case is more reasonable in view
of the added burden placed on court officers in processing today's greater
volume of litigation. "The clerk is not controlled by the statute of
limitations in the performance of his duties nor is he empowered by
statute to exercise any control over its operation and effect." 22  Further-
more, it seems unreasonable to require an attorney to spend valuable
time in the courthouse making certain that the summons is placed in
the hands of the sheriff on the day the petition is filed. The instant
decision is, therefore, a step forward in Ohio judicial procedure which will
serve to eliminate some of the injustices which occurred under the prior
rule.
GARY L. BRYENTON
MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY - PROPRIETARY AND
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963).
Plaintiff Hack alleged injuries suffered through the negligent opera-
tion of a municipal swimming pool in Salem, Ohio. The defendant city
demurred to the petition on the grounds that it did not state a cause of
action. The issue in Hack v. City of Salem was whether the operation of
a municipal swimming pool was a proprietary function or a governmental
function immune from tort liability.' The common pleas court sustained
the demurrer and the Court of Appeals for Columbiana County affirmed
the decision. After granting a motion to certify, the Ohio Supreme Court
18. FED. R. Cx. P. 3.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (a).
20. See "Open Forum" Discussion of Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 AB.AJ. 965
(1937). Whether, under these rules, filing the complaint or issuance of summons consti-
tuted "commencement" of the action is a problem which presented itself to the Advisory
Committee, but was unanswered. It appears, however, that the provisions of rule 4 (a) which
require the clerk to issue the summons "forthwith" and deliver it to the marshal for service
will reduce the chances of such a question arising.
21. Newberg v. American Dryer Corp., 195 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (filing com-
plaint stopped statute even though summons not served until several months later); Robinson
v. Waterman S.S. Co., 7 F.R.D. 51 (D.N.J. 1947); International Pulp Equip. Co. v. St. Regis
Kraft Co., 55 F. Supp. 860 (D. Del. 1944)
22. Robinson v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 174 Ohio St. 498, 503, 190 N.E.2d 441,
444 (1963).
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reversed the lower court decisions, holding that the function was proprie-
tary, and remanded the case for a determination of liability and damages. 2
The supreme court held that both lower court decisions were based
on obiter dictum in Selden v. City of Cuyahoga Falls.3 Hence, the court
was warranted in determining whether the operation of a municipal
swimming pool was a governmental or a proprietary function. The court
applied the test of City of Wooster v. Arbenz4 and held the function pro-
prietary' since the state legislature imposed no duty on municipal corpora-
tions to operate swimming pools and such a pool was operated for the
comfort and convenience of its citizens.6
In terms of finding the operation of a municipal swimming pool a
proprietary function, the Hack case is of no great moment. The signifi-
cance of Hack lies in the fact that it represents an initial effort by the
supreme court to set forth the rationale of Ohio's position concerning
municipal tort liability. Further, the court indicated no enchantment
with the position of municipal immunity in Ohio. In fact, three judges,
in a vigorous concurring opinion, expressed their dissatisfaction with the
concept of municipal immunity in negligence suits.
Subsequent to the instant case, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Ball v.
City of Reynoldsburg, ruled that the maintenance of a sewer system in
Reynoldsburg, Ohio was proprietary. It must be noted, however, that of
the three judges who participated in the concurring opinion in the Hack
case, two joined the majority in Ball, thus apparently deserting their po-
sition taken in Hack. But this does not destroy Hack's significance for
two reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that maintenance of a
sewer system in Ball was dearly a proprietary function, while operation of
a swimming pool in Hack could have been declared governmental. Since
Ball involved a dear proprietary function, there was no necessity to main-
rain the position advocated in Hack. Second, the significance of Hack
does not lie primarily in the concurring opinion but rather in the fact that
1. PROSSER, TORTS 775-77 (2d ed. 1955). Functions and activities which can be per-
formed adequately only by government are said to be governmental in character and immune
from tort liability. However, when the city performs a service which could be performed
adequately by a private corporation, and particularly when the municipality collects revenue
from it, the function is considered proprietary. A negligently performed proprietary function
will render the municipality subject to liability.
2. Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963). The decision was
unanimous for remand, but four to three in favor of maintaining the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions as they relate to liability in a negligence action against
a municipal corporation.
3. 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.R2d 976 (1937).
4. 116 Ohio St. 281, 284, 156 N.E. 210, 211 (1927).
5. Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 388-90, 189 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (1963).
6. If the court determined that the operation of the pool would be directly beneficial to
public health as opposed to mere comfort and convenience, the operation of such a pool would
be a governmental function.
7. 175 Ohio St. 128, 192 N.F.2d 51 (1963).
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the Ohio court has finally enunciated the rationale for maintaining the
status quo. More important, although stating Ohio's position, the court
seemed to deliberately refrain from approving the status quo, and as will
be seen below, only begged the question with its protests about being
unable to disturb precedent and statements about leaving the task of
change to the Ohio General Assembly.
The majority in Hack seems hidebound by three "principles of law"
which it advances as controlling.
1. The doctrine of stare decisis requires the court to provide im-
munity for municipalities in their governmental functions.8
2. Sovereign immunity requires non-liability for the governmental
functions of municipalities.'
3. It is the function of the legislature to change Ohio law on this
subject.' °
After an extensive analysis of the history of the problem," the con-
curring opinion attacks all three "controlling principles of law" advanced
by the majority. The concurring opinion, written by Judge Gibson, notes
that the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected the dictates of stare decisis
when it became necessary to change a basic position.
This court was not afraid to reject the doctrine of stare decisis in
Avellone v. St. John's Hospital['21 ... when, upon looking at the facts
as they exist in the 20th Century, it held that notwithstanding stare
decisis a corporation not for profit, which has as its purpose the main-
tenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, liable for the torts of its servants. 13
The notion that sovereign immunity 4 serves as a basis for non-lia-
8. Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 387, 189 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1963).
9. Id. at 387, 189 N.E.2d at 860-61. It would seem that sovereign immunity does not pro-
vide a logical basis upon which to base Ohio's position. For is it not a non-sequitur to argue
that some suits (based on negligence in performing proprietary functions and nuisance) may
be maintained against a sovereign while others (based on negligence in performing govern-
mental functions) may not be maintained because the sovereign is immune from suit?
10. Id. at 384, 189 N.E.2d at 858.
11. Id. at 391-95, 189 N.E.2d at 862-67.
12. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
13. Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 396, 189 N.E.2d 857, 868 (1963). Courts
which abolished non-liability for negligently performed governmental functions are not per-
suaded by the argument that the doctrine of stare decisis is controlling. See Stone v. Arizona
Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 218, 359 P.2d 457, 461 (1961); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231,
111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962).
14. It is interesting to note that the notion of sovereign immunity is even imputed to a
municipal corporation. Perhaps imprecise thinking has fostered this notion. A municipal
corporation cannot command immunity allegedly reserved only to the sovereign. This is the
prerogative of the state. However, in the exercise of governmental functions, the municipal
corporation loses its identity and is viewed as an arm of the state. In this fashion it may
invoke the immunity of the state. In the exercise of proprietary functions, the municipal
corporation loses its public capacity and is rendered liable. See generally PROSSER, TORTS
§ 109 (2d ed. 1955).
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bility has been so severely criticized " that it is somewhat surprising that
the majority even advances this proposition to support its argument."l
In contrast, Judge Gibson declares that the concept of sovereign immunity
"is clearly wrong."' 7  In support of this view, the concurring opinion
points to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Langford v.
United States: 8
We do not understand that either in reference to the Government of
the United States, or to the several States ... the English maxim [the
King can do no wrong] has an existence in this country.
The final argument of the majority, that the legislature must be the
instrument of change, is met in the concurring opinion by the fact that
negligence as well as non-liability for governmental functions is judi-
dally created.
In no other area of the law has legislation played such a small part. The
immunity provided to muncipalities for injuries arising out of govern-
mental functions . .. is entirely the handiwork of the courts.19
The most succinct rebuttal to the argument of dependence on the legisla-
ture is found in Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n.2  "We
dosed our court room doors without legislative help, and we can likewise
open them."
2
'
Since 1959, eight states have abolished the outmoded rule of munici-
pal immunity.22  Each court has encountered the three "principles of
law" brandished by the majority in Hack and each principle has been
found wanting. The reasoning of the courts in all eight states has
paralleled the strong arguments offered by the concurring opinion in
Hack. First, there is no valid reason for the "unjust consequences" of
15. PROSSER, TORTS 774-80 (2d ed. 1955); Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Green, Freedom of Litigation: Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L.
REV. 355 (1944); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921);
Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476
(1953); Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrine of Municipal Tort Liability,
9 LAw & CoNThMP. PROB. 214 (1942). For a general treatment of the entire area see 9
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 179-370 (1942); Annot., 160 A.LR. 7 (1946).
16. It would seem that considerations of public policy, although weak, would constitute a
somewhat more tenable basis. However, the majority rules out this possibility. Hack v. City
of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 387, 189 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (1963).
17. Id. at 395, 189 N.E.2d at 867.
18. 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879). (Emphasis added.)
19. Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 396-97, 189 N.E.2d 857, 868 (1963).
20. 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
21. Id. at 167, 260 P.2d at 774. See also Green, Freedom of Litigation: Municipal Liability
for Torts, 38 ILL. L. RV. 355 (1944).
22. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Colorado Racing Comm'n v.
Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961);
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
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